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of	mine	accidents	in	Tajikistan.	Children	ac-
count	for	20	percent	of	these	casualties.		
The	problem	of	mine	contamination	se-
riously	affects	the	civil	population	who	are	
engaged	in	farming,	wood	gathering,	graz-
ing	 and	 activities	 related	 to	 normal	 rural	
life.	 Landmines	 also	 adversely	 affect	 agri-
cultural	development,	the	environment	and	
the	economy	of	the	country.	Almost	all	the	
inhabitants	within	at-risk	communities	have	
received	mine-risk	education	and	awareness	
training.	 Still,	 economic	 imperatives	 drive	
local	populations	 to	continue	visiting	haz-
ardous	 areas,	which	 often	 results	 in	 death	
and	injury.	
Tajikistan Mine Action Centre 
On	20	June	2003,	the	Tajik	government	
signed	an	agreement	with	the	United	Nations	
Development	 Programme	 called	 “Support	
to	 the	 Tajikistan	 National	 Mine	 Action	
Programme,”	and	the	Tajikistan	Mine	Action	
Centre	was	established.	The	Centre	is	a	gov-
ernmental	 structure	 and	 is	 responsible	 for	
all	mine-action-related	 issues	 in	Tajikistan.	
It	 is	also	the	executive	authority	of	 the	na-
tional	 Commission	 on	 Implementation	 of	
International	Humanitarian	Law.	
Planning, Monitoring and 
Coordinating 
TMAC	 develops	 mine-action	 plans	
(strategic	 and	 annual),	 national	 standards	
and	 other	 strategic	 documents	 related	
to	 mine	 action	 and	 submits	 them	 to	 the	
Commission	 on	 the	 Implementation	 of	
International	 Humanitarian	 Law	 for	 ap-
proval.	 Implementation	 of	 the	 Tajik	Mine	
Action	 Programme	 is	 in	 accordance	 with	
the	 Mine	 Action	 Strategic	 Five-year	 Plan	
for	 200–0	 and	 the	 Annual	 Plan,	 which	
CIIHL	approved	on	13	April	200.
TMAC	 is	 responsible	 for	 coordinating	
and	monitoring	all	mine-action	activities	in	
Tajikistan.	Within	this	framework,	TMAC	
updates	 the	national	mine-action	plan	and	
undertakes	the	development,	priority	selec-
tion,	 planning	 and	 coordination	 of	 opera-
tions.	It	also	prioritizes	new	tasks,	confirms	
completion	 of	 tasks	 and	 gives	 certificates	
of	cleared	sites	 to	 local	authorities.	TMAC	
provides	 its	 partners	 with	 information	 on	
mined	 areas	 and	operations	 obtained	 from	
the	 Information	 Management	 System	 for	
Mine	Action,	 as	well	 as	 on	mine	 incidents	
and	mine	survivors.	
TMAC	 quality-assurance	 officers	 con-
firm	 that	 demining	 management	 methods	
and	procedures	are	 in	accordance	with	na-
tional	and	international	standards.	
TMAC’s	 major	 partners	 are	 the	
UNDP,	 the	 Organization	 for	 Security	
and	Cooperation	 in	Europe,	 the	European	
Union,	 the	 International	 Committee	 of	
the	 Red	 Cross,	 UNICEF,	 the	 Tajikistan	
Red	Crescent,	 representatives	 of	 the	 donor	
countries	 in	Tajikistan,	Fondation Suisse de 
Déminage,	the	Geneva	International	Centre	
for	Humanitarian	Demining,	Ministries	of	
Security,	 Justice,	 Interior,	 Foreign	 Affairs,	
Education,	 Labour	 and	 Social	 Protection,	
Defence,	Health,	and	Emergency	Situations,	
the	 State	 Committee	 for	 Protection	 of	 the	
State	Border	and	local	executive	authorities.
Mine Clearance
In	 accordance	 with	 Article	 	 of	 the	
Ottawa	 Convention,	 each	 State	 Party	 un-
dertakes	to	destroy	or	ensure	the	destruction	
of	all	AP	mines	in	mined	areas	under	its	ju-
risdiction	or	control,	as	soon	as	possible	but	
not	 later	 than	10	years	 after	 the	 entry	 into	
force	of	 this,	 for	Tajikistan	 this	deadline	 is	
1	April	2010.	
As	 a	 signatory	 to	 the	 Convention,	
Tajikistan	 completed	 destruction	 of	 its	
stockpiles	 (3,029	 AP	mines)	 on	 31	March	
200.	The	Ministry	of	Defence,	 supported	
by	Fondation Suisse de Déminage,	undertook	
the	destruction.	
On	 20	 June	 2003,	 the	 government	
signed	 an	 agreement	with	FSD.	Funding	 is	
channelled	 through	 the	 UNDP	 and	 the	
Organization	for	Security	and	Cooperation	
in	 Europe,	 and	 FSD	 is	 now	 the	 national	
survey	 and	 mine-clearance	 partner	 in	
Tajikistan,	 with	 four	 survey	 and	 four	
mine-clearance	 teams.	 More	 than	 100	
mined	areas	have	been	identified	so	far	as	a	
result	of	survey	operations.
In	200,	three	mined	areas	were	cleared	
and	handed	over	to	local	authorities	for	fu-
ture	 use.	 Since	 the	 Technical	 Survey	 and	
mine	 clearance	 started	 in	 July	 200,	more	
than	10,000	square	metres	(	acres)	and	
more	than	2,000	mines	and	items	of	UXO	
have	been	cleared.
To	 speed	 the	 process	 of	 mine	 clear-
ance,	TMAC	plans	to	establish	four	mine-
detecting	 dog	 teams.	 TMAC	 thinks	 this	
issue	is	very	important	for	the	programme,	
and	 the	 Centre	 is	 looking	 for	 donors	 to	
fund	the	project.	
Mine-risk Education
The	Red	Crescent	Society	of	Tajikistan,	
supported	by	 the	 ICRC	and	UNDP,	 is	un-
dertaking	MRE	in	1	districts	of	the	country	
(border	areas	of	 the	Sugd	region,	 the	Rasht	
valley	and	Vanj,	and	the	Darvoz	districts	of	the	
Gorno	Badakhshan	region).	In	August	200,	
UNICEF	initiated	a	small,	joint	pilot	project	
together	with	 the	Ministry	of	Education	of	
Tajikistan.	RCST	and	UNICEF	volunteers	
conduct	complementary	activities	to	educate	
the	local	population	about	mine	hazards	and	
how	to	live	with	landmines.
More	 than	 3,200	 large	 mine-hazard	
warning	signs	have	been	manufactured	and	
more	than	2,200	were	placed	in	border	areas	
in	 the	Sugd	 region.	The	 remainder	will	 be	
erected	in	the	southern	part	of	the	country.	
In	addition,	to	provide	more	information	on	
MRE	activities,	the	U.N.	booklet	Guideline 
to Mine & UXO Safety was	 translated	 and	
6,000	 copies	 in	 Tajik	 and	 3,000	 copies	 in	
Uzbek	 languages	 were	 distributed.	 More	
than	 22,000	 leaflets	 were	 issued	 with	 ap-
propriate	guidelines	 for	distribution	by	 the	
programme’s	volunteers,	military	personnel,	
local	 authorities,	 teachers	 and	 active	 advo-
cates	of	the	programme.	
Assistance to Survivors
A	project	called	Assistance	 to	Landmine	
Survivors,	 implemented	 within	 the	 frame-
work	 of	 cooperation	 among	 the	 Ministry	
of	 Labour	 and	 Social	 Protection	 of	 the	
Population	 of	 the	 Republic	 of	 Tajikistan,	
ICRC,	 UNDP	 and	 RCST,	 assists	 disabled	
persons,	 including	 landmine	 survivors,	 by	
providing	prostheses	and	medical	assistance	in	
the	national	Orthopaedic	Centre,	Dushanbe.	
An	 income-generation	 project	 implemented	
by	 RCST	 in	 200	 delivered	 breeding	 pairs	
of	 goats	 or	 sheep	 to	 72	 landmine	 survivors	
in	 three	mine-affected	districts	 of	 the	 Sugd	
region	 and	 three	 mine-affected	 districts	 of	
Rasht	valley.	These	 individuals	can	now	es-
tablish	small-scale	livestock	enterprises,	each	
returning	one	offspring	 to	 the	RCST	 to	 re-
distribute	and	expand	the	project.	There	is	a	
need	 to	 extend	 this	 project	 in	 the	 future	 to	
provide	for	all	mine	survivors.
A deminer works at mine clearance.
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B oth	 sides	 in	 Tajikistan’s	 five-year	 civil	 war	 in	 the	1990s	used	anti-personnel	mines	and	many	of	these	weapons	remain	in	place	in	the	country’s	central	area.	
Uzbek	forces	laid	APMs	along	their	border	with	Tajikistan	
and	some	remain	in	disputed	territory.	Minefields	also	exist	
along	the	border	with	Afghanistan	in	land	recently	handed	
over	to	Tajik	sovereignty	by	Russian	forces.	Nearly	10	years	
after	 the	end	of	 the	civil	war,	 landmines	continue	 to	cre-
ate	obstacles	for	accessing	grazing	and	agricultural	land	in	
Tajikistan	and	cause	economic	hardship	for	its	people.	The	
problem	of	landmines	and	explosive	remnants	of	war	con-
tributes	to	human	suffering	and	livestock	loss.
	The	landmine	issue	continues	to	be	a	source	of	concern	
for	 the	 government	 of	 Tajikistan	 and	 demining	 remains	
vitally	 important	to	national	development	plans.	Foreign-
manufactured	 landmines	 kill,	 maim	 and	 threaten	 rural	
Tajiks	who	are	living	in	the	poorest	areas	of	their	own	coun-
try.	Landmines	were	placed	by	the	Soviet	Union,	Russian	
forces	 (following	 Tajik	 independence),	 the	 Tajiks	 them-
selves,	and	Uzbek	forces	along	Uzbek-Tajik	borders.	Areas	
on	the	Afghan	and	Uzbek	borders	and	former	battlefields	in	
the	central	region	continue	to	present	a	hazard	to	the	rural	
poor	who	have	to	live	with	the	threat	of	explosive	remnants	
of	war	as	part	of	their	daily	lives.	
The	 Tajikistan	 national	 government	 has	 adopted	 a	
long-term	strategic	plan,	one	that	is	linked	to	mine-action	
goals	 and	 national	 development	 plans.	 The	 government’s	
Mine	Action	Programme
by Jonmahmad Rajabov 
[ Tajikistan Mine Action Centre ]
The Tajikistan Mine Action Centre is 
responsible for all mine-action-related 
programs in the country. The author 
details Tajikistan’s landmine problems 
and provides a report on TMAC’s 
progress in various aspects of mine 
action as well as its goals for future 
mine-related operations.   
Tajikistan
commitment	 to	 mine-action	 initiatives	 is	 visible	 and	 in-
creasing.	Tajikistan	has	been	a	State	Party	of	 the	Ottawa	
Convention1	since	1	April	2000,	and	the	government	is	also	
a	signatory	of	Amended	Protocol	II	of	the	Convention	on	
Certain	Conventional	Weapons.2	
Humanitarian Impact of AP Mines and UXO 
Landmines	 and	 items	 of	 unexploded	 ordnance	 ap-
peared	in	the	central	part	of	Tajikistan	during	the	civil	war	
years	when	both	 sides	 of	 the	 conflict	 used	 anti-personnel	
mines	 and	 other	 munitions	 along	 the	 Tajik-Uzbek	 and	
Tajik-Afghan	borders.	The	central	region	incorporates	the	
Tavildara	region	and	the	Rasht	Valley,	as	well	as	parts	of	the	
Gorno-Badakhshan	 region.	 Landmines,	 UXO	 and	 other	
remnants	of	war	continue	to	be	a	hazard	for	the	people	in	
this	region.
Along	some	parts	of	the	Tajik	border	with	Afghanistan,	
Russian	forces	and	border	troops	laid	and	maintained	mines	
to	counter	cross-border	infiltration	and	for	self-protection.	
In	200,	Russian	forces	completed	the	hand-over	process	to	
Tajik	colleagues.	Mine	records	were	also	provided.
Uzbek	forces	laid	APMs	along	the	border	with	Tajikistan,	
and	the	first	deaths	and	injuries	involving	civilians	in	this	bor-
der	area	were	reported	in	August	1999.	Seventy-two	deaths	
and		injuries	have	occurred	in	these	communities,	and	in	
excess	of	2,000	head	of	livestock	have	been	lost.	Since	1992,	
239	people	 have	 been	 injured	 and	23	killed	 as	 the	 result	
Establishing international cooperation during the meetings of the 
Standing Committees of the Ottawa Convention.
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N on-state	actors	often	have	more	 limited	military	 resources	than	the	states	against	which	they	fight	and,	therefore,	use	landmines,	“the	poor	man’s	weapon,”	more	frequently.	As	
a	 consequence,	 the	number	of	NSAs	using	 landmines	 significantly	
exceeds	the	number	of	states	deploying	this	weapon.
Around	60	NSAs	have	emplaced	landmines	in	2	countries	across	
five	 geographic	 regions:	 sub-Saharan	 Africa,	 Asia,	 Europe,	 Latin	
America	 and	 the	Middle	 East/North	 Africa.2	 In	 addition	 to	 these	
NSAs,	armed	groups,	which	are	difficult	to	identify	as	belonging	to	
a	certain	category	of	ideology	or	organizational	form,	have	also	made	
frequent	 use	 of	 landmines	 in	 a	 few	 other	 countries.	Two-thirds	 of	
these	 groups	 have	 deployed	 some	 type	 of	 victim-activated	 devices.	
These	 devices	 were	 both	 factory-made	 and	 handmade,	 indicating	
NSA	involvement	in	both	the	transfer	and	the	production	of	mines.
Armed Non-State Actors and Landmines. Volume I: A Global Report 
Profiling NSAs and their Use, Acquisition, Production, Transfer and 
Stockpiling of Landmines2	confirmed	earlier	findings	of	important	re-
gional	disparities,	not	the	least	of	which	was	the	comparatively	higher	
concentration	of	mine	use	by	NSAs	in	Asia,	especially	of	improvised	
explosive	devices	(aka	handmade	mines).3	The	second	most	affected	
region	is	Africa.	
A	 greater	 proportion	 of	 NSA	 mine	 use	 occurs	 in	 Ottawa	
Convention	non-signatory	countries:	60	percent	of	the	NSAs	identi-
fied	as	mine	users	operate	in	these	countries.2	Given	that	11	of	the	
world’s	approximately	200	states	have	adhered	to	this	 international	
agreement,	it	appears	that	non-signatories	are	more	exposed	to	NSA	
mine	 use	 than	 are	 States	 Parties.	This	 is	 not	 to	 say,	 however,	 that	
Armed	Non-state	Actors:	The	Main	Users	of	the	
by Anki Sjöberg [ Geneva Call ]
This report, which builds on the 2004 Geneva 
Call initial analysis,1 provides a comprehensive 
mapping of the use, acquisition, production, 
transfer and stockpiling of landmines by armed 
non-state actors through a presentation of 
individual group profiles and a global analysis. 
The report records global occurrences of anti-
personnel and anti-vehicle mine planting by 
NSAs during 2003–2005, whether activated 
by victims, vehicles or at a distance using 
command detonation. 
“Poor	Man’s	Weapon”
being	a	party	to	the	Ottawa	Convention	protects	a	country	from	NSA	
mine	deployment.	Indeed,	two	very	frequent	mine	users,	the	Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia	and	the	Ejército de Liberación 
Nacional,	operate	in	Colombia,	a	State	Party.
Frequency of Mine Use
Keeping	 in	 mind	 the	 differences	 in	 mine	 use	 among	 NSAs	 is	
crucial	in	choosing	the	most	appropriate	strategy	for	engaging	them	
in	 a	mine	 ban.	 It	 is	 clear	 there	 are	 significant	 disparities	 between	
NSAs,	not	only	in	terms	of	the	reasons	that	motivate	their	mine	use	
and	 the	 types	 of	mines	 they	 choose	 to	 employ,	 but	 also	 in	 respect	
to	the	frequency	of	use.	For	some	NSAs,	landmines	constitute	one	
of	their	weapons	of	choice.	Examples	of	such	groups	include	FARC	
and	ELN	in	Colombia,	several	Burmese	and	Kashmiri	groups,	and	
the	Communist	Party	of	Nepal–Maoist.	Other	groups	deploy	mines	
when	they	have	access	to,	or	a	particular	“need”	for,	mines.	Instances	
of	 this	are	 the	Lord’s	Resistance	Army	 in	Uganda,	 the	Abu	Sayyaf	
Group	 in	 the	 Philippines	 and	 the	 Rahanwein	 Resistance	 Army	 in	
Somalia.	 Some	 groups,	 such	 as	 the	Party	 for	 the	Liberation	of	 the	
Hutu	People–National	Liberation	Forces	in	Burundi	and	the	Sendero 
Luminoso	in	Peru,	are	sporadic	users.
Logic Behind NSA Mine Use
Although	 deemed	 by	 many	 as	 lacking	 decisive	 military	 utility	
and	despite	their	disastrous	humanitarian	consequences,	landmines	
clearly	 serve	 different	 purposes	 for	 each	NSA	 that	 employs	 them.1	
Knowing	why	and	how	NSAs	use	these	weapons	could	contribute	to	
Sudan People’s Liberation Army combatant in South Sudan.
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TMAC,	 in	 cooperation	 with	 the	
MLSPP,	 ICRC,	 UNDP,	 and	 RCS,	 organ-
ized	a	summer	camp	for	32	mine	survivors	
in	Romit	 valley	 of	 the	Vahdat	district	 in	
July	200.	The	camp	provided	the	survi-
vors	an	opportunity	 for	psychological	 re-
habilitation	and	social	integration.
Advocacy 
A	 regional	 conference,	 “Progress	 to-
wards	 the	 Ottawa	 Convention’s	 Aims	 in	
Central	Asia,”	was	held	1–16	April	200,	in	
Dushanbe.	The	conference	was	organized	by	
the	UNDP	with	the	support	of	 the	Geneva	
International	 Centre	 for	 Humanitarian	
Demining.	 Official	 representatives	 of	 cen-
tral	 Asian	 countries	 and	 Afghanistan,	 the	
UNDP,	the	OCSE,	the	GICHD,	the	North	
Atlantic	Treaty	Organization,	and	the	ICRC,	
representatives	of	diplomatic	corps	and	inter-
national	organizations	registered	in	Tajikistan,	
governmental	authorities	and	NGO	represent-
atives	took	part	in	the	conference.	Participants	
discussed	 the	 implementation	 process	 of	 the	
Ottawa	Convention	in	the	region	on	the	eve	
of	 the	 First	 Review	 Conference	 in	 Nairobi,	
Kenya.	The	conference	adopted	a	statement	
that	stressed	the	necessity	of	support	for	the	
process	of	the	Ottawa	Convention	and	the	
need	for	the	central	Asian	countries	to	ac-
cede	to	the	Convention.	It	pleased	officials	
that	 Her	Majesty	 Queen	 Noor	 of	 Jordan	
took	part	in	the	conference.
The	 official	 delegation	 of	 the	 Republic	
of	 Tajikistan	 took	 part	 in	 the	 First	 Review	
Conference	in	Nairobi	and	made	a	presenta-
tion	 about	 the	process	 of	 implementing	 the	
Ottawa	Convention.	TMAC	and	other	gov-
ernmental	representatives	continue	to	take	an	
active	 role	 in	 international	 conferences	 and	
meetings	 on	 the	 banning	 of	 anti-personnel	
mines.	 TMAC	 conducts	 ongoing	 train-
ing,	meetings,	 liaison	and	other	activities	as	
part	of	the	process	of	implementation	of	the	
Tajikistan	Mine	Action	Programme.
Reporting 
In	 accordance	 with	 Article	 7	 of	 the	
Ottawa	 Convention,	 the	 Republic	 of	
Tajikistan	submits	its	annual	reports	to	the	
U.N.	Secretary-General	on	the	country’s	mine-
contamination	status	and	on	the	completion	
process	to	comply	with	the	Convention.		
Conclusion
The	 Civil	 War	 of	 the	 1990s	 created	 a	
mine/UXO	 problem	 for	 Tajikistan	 that	 is	
still	 threatening	 the	 daily	 lives	 of	 its	 citi-
zens	 a	 decade	 later.	 The	 Tajikistan	 Mine	
Action	Centre	is	remedying	the	devastating	
effects	 this	 problem	 has	 had	 on	 the	 coun-
try.	 TMAC,	 with	 international	 support,	
has	started	and	will	continue	to	make	huge	
strides	 in	 mine/UXO	 clearance,	 mine-risk	
education	and	victim	assistance.
See Endnotes, page 112
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Rigged Mine Blast Kills 64, Injures More
A powerful landmine blast ripped through a passenger bus loaded with commuters and schoolchildren in 
northern Sri Lanka in early June. The attack, attributed to the terrorist group Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam (popularly known as the Tamil Tigers), killed more than 64 people and injured dozens more. 
Officials said many of the injured were bystanders not on the bus.
The explosion tore through the packed bus in a crowded part of Kabithigollewa, a town about 200 
kilometers (125 miles) north of the capital, Colombo. Military officials said the blast came from two 
landmines hanging from a tree and rigged to detonate when signaled from a remote position. Rigging mines 
above ground on trees and other structures is a common Tiger tactic to reduce blast shielding provided 
by the ground. The Tigers strongly denied responsibility for the attack after government officials 
assigned blame to the group. The bus bombing was the most violent act since a tentative ceasefire in 
2002 and brings the divided country even closer to total war.
 
The Sri Lankan Air Force responded later by bombing several rebel-held areas in other parts of the 
country. The Tigers are a separatist terrorist group seeking independence of certain areas from Sri 
Lanka and have been classified as a foreign terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State.
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 36
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol10/iss1/36
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can	 be	 seen	 in	 Angola,	 South	 Sudan	 and	
Sri	Lanka.
NSAs	all	over	the	world	are	victimized	by	
their	own	mines,	as	well	as	 those	deployed	
by	 governments,	 paramilitaries	 and	 other	
NSAs.	The	fact	that	their	own	combatants	
are	also	victimized	could	be	used	in	negotia-
tions	for	a	mine	ban	with	NSAs.	Access	to	
victim	assistance	 for	 combatants	who	have	
suffered	mine	 incidents	 could	also	be	used	
as	a	carrot	in	negotiations.	
Effects of AV Mine Use 
Some	30	NSAs	used	AV	mines	between	
2003	and	200.2	As	is	shown	in	numerous	
studies,	AV	mines	triggered	by	vehicles	are	
also	 indiscriminate	 weapons.	 However,	
since	 NSAs	 in	 many	 conflicts	 largely	 de-
pend	on	these	weapons,	it	appears	unlikely	
that	many	of	 them	would	agree	 to	 a	 total	
ban	on	AV	mines.	Nevertheless,	some	NSAs	
have	expressed	an	interest	in	also	banning	
these	weapons.
Need for Prioritization 
When	engaging	NSAs,	priorities	must	be	
set	as	to	when	and	where	to	allocate	scarce	
resources:	 If	 humanitarian	 actors	 target	 a	
group	 that	 is	 a	 frequent	 user	 and	 manage	
to	 involve	 it	 in	 the	mine	 ban,	 the	 benefits	
for	the	population	are	greater;	yet	a	sporadic	
user	 or	 non-user	may	 be	more	 open	 to	 re-
nouncing	 the	use	of	mines	 since	mines	are	
not	a	crucial	part	of	its	military	strategy.	
The Global Report,	by	explaining	specific	
characteristics	of	 the	NSAs	and	their	mine	
use,	 intends	 to	 provide	 a	 background	 tool	
for	humanitarian	actors	to	strategize	regard-
ing	 which	 non-state	 actors	 to	 target	 and	
what	 the	appropriate	approaches	might	be.	
For	 instance,	one	way	of	conducting	advo-
cacy	is	through	direct	contact	with	a	group’s	
leadership.	Another	way	is	by	disseminating	
mine-ban	information	within	civil	society	in	
order	to	create	a	bottom-up	pressure	on	the	
group.	 In	 addition,	 understanding	 regional	
patterns	 is	 essential,	 since	 these	 may	 have	
important	consequences	for	the	engagement	
and	implementation	of	strategies	for	a	mine	
ban.	This	may	be	particularly	true	 in	cases	
where	regional	dynamics	appear	to	fuel	the	
landmine	 problem	 or	 provide	 possibilities	
for	its	solution.
NSA Involvement in Mine Action 
Considering	 the	 disastrous	 effects	 of	
landmine	 use,	 there	 is	 a	 requirement	 for	
national	 and	 international	 agencies	 to	 un-
dertake	 mine	 action	 in	 areas	 where	 NSAs	
operate	and/or	are	in	control,	as	encouraged	
in	 Action	 6	 of	 the	Nairobi	 Action	 Plan.	
Given	the	benefits	of	mine	action	to	affected	
populations,	 it	 is	 indefensible	 for	 the	 con-
cerned	governments	to	allow	such	actions.	
Indeed,	NSAs	are	contributing	to	mine	
action	in	different	areas	around	the	world,	
notably	 in	 Sudan,	 Sri	 Lanka	 and	 Iraqi	
Kurdistan.	 In	 order	 to	 map	 the	 benefits	
and	 challenges	 related	 to	 the	 involvement	
of	 non-state	 actors	 in	 humanitarian	 dem-
ining	and	to	encourage	other	NSAs	to	ban	
anti-personnel	 mines	 and	 get	 involved	 in	
mine	action,	 there	 is	a	need	 to	 further	 in-
vestigate	 current	 mine-action	 efforts	 un-
dertaken	 by	 these	 actors	 in	 conflict	 and	
post-conflict	 situations.	 Geneva	 Call	 is	
currently	 working	 on	 such	 a	 report	 about	
NSA	mine	action.	In	fact,	the	Global Report	
is	 part	 of	 a	 bigger	project	 that	 studies	 the	
negative	and	positive	implications	of	NSAs	
in	the	landmine	problem.	This	project	grew	
out	 of	 the	 realization	 that	 only	 by	 under-
standing	 NSA-	 and	 region-specific	 dy-
namics	is	it	possible	to	address	the	current	
and	 future	 landmine	 problem	 as	 it	 relates	
to	NSAs.
Conclusion
The	Global Report clearly	demonstrates	a	
need	to	discuss	the	mine	issue	with	non-state	
actors.	Many	NSAs	(as	well	as	states)	lack	the	
long-term	perspective	of	the	consequences	of	
mine	use,	 and	 it	 is	 therefore	crucial	 for	 the	
international	community	to	find	channels	of	
communication	with	NSAs	on	the	AP	mine	
issue.	Parties	to	conflict	often	use	accusations	
of	AP	mine	use	to	discredit	the	other	party	be-
cause	of	the	stigmatization	of	such	arms	fol-
lowing	the	Ottawa	process,	but	also	because	
of	the	natural	“perception	of	landmines	as	an	
illegitimate	type	of	weapon.”9	NSAs,	as	well	
as	states,	are	thus	reluctant	to	admit	they	are	
using	 a	 victim-activated	weapon.	This	 sug-
gests	an	inclusive	approach—involving	advo-
cacy	based	on	accurate	information—could	
be	 the	 key	 to	 success	 for	 spreading	 a	mine	
ban	among	NSAs.
This article is drawn from a report pro-
duced by Geneva Call, Armed	 Non-State	
Actors	 and	 Landmines, Volume	 I:	 A	
Global	 Report	 Profiling	 NSAs	 and	 their	
Use,	 Acquisition,	 Production,	 Transfer	
and	 Stockpiling	 of	 Landmines,2 which was 
published in November 2005. The report 
can be downloaded from Geneva Call’s Web 
site at http://www.genevacall.org. Hard copies 
can be obtained by writing to info@genevacall.org.
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developing	 a	 successful	 strategy	 for	 engag-
ing	these	groups	in	the	landmine	ban.	Four	
reasons	 for	mine	use	were	 identified	as	 the	
purpose	of	the	report:	
1.	 Offensive
2.	 Defensive
3.	 Economic	gain	
.	 So-called	“nuisance	mining”	
Many	 NSAs	 use	 landmines	 in	 an	 of-
fensive	 manner;	 for	 example,	 the	 CPN-M	
in	Nepal,	the	Kurdistan	People’s	Congress/
Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan	 (Kongra-Gel/
PKK)	 in	Turkey,	 the	Communist	 Party	 of	
India–Maoist	 in	 India,	 and	 the	 Taliban	
in	 Afghanistan.	 However,	 offensive	 use	 is	
probably	significantly	over-reported	since	it	
is	more	visible.	
NSAs	 often	 confirm	 not	 only	 offensive	
but	 also	 defensive	 mine	 uses.	 Indeed,	 ac-
cording	 to	 a	majority	 of	NSAs,	 landmines	
are	 mainly	 utilized	 for	 defensive	 pur-
poses.	 The	 Burmese	 Rohingya	 Solidarity	
Organization	has	 admitted	 to	using	mines	
to	defend	its	camps	and	bases	as	well	as	to	
protect	 its	members	 from	 robbery	 or	 from	
the	Bangladeshi	Army.	The	Chin	National	
Front	(Burma/Myanmar)	has	also	admitted	
to	 using	mines	 for	 self-defense,	 apparently	
to	protect	its	camps.	
Landmine	 use	 for	 economic	 purposes	
is	not	 frequently	 reported,	 although	 this	 is	
probably	due	to	underreporting	rather	than	
the	 insignificance	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 use.	 For	
example,	 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias 
de Colombia	allegedly	utilizes	landmines	for	
the	protection	of	coca	plantations,	whereas	
the	Movement	of	the	Democratic	Forces	of	
Casamance	 in	 Senegal	 is	 thought	 to	 plant	
landmines	 to	 hinder	 the	 local	 population	
from	 benefiting	 from	 economically	 profit-
able	land.	
As	 for	 nuisance	 mining,	 the	 most	 cit-
ed	 example	 is	 probably	 that	 of	 the	 Lord’s	
Resistance	 Army.	 Nuisance	 mining	 is	 the	
use	 of	 mines	 that	 serve	 no	 direct	 military	
or	 economic	 purpose.	 This	 includes	 using	
mines	to	interfere	with	strategic	infrastruc-
ture,	such	as	communications	and	railways,	
or	 to	 affect	 civilians.	 Other	 examples	 are	
groups	 in	 Colombia	 and	 the	 Democratic	
Republic	 of	 the	 Congo.	 FARC	 allegedly	
placed	mines	at	the	entrances	of	a	town	and	
in	houses	and	vehicles	before	the	army	took	
over	the	area.3
Command-detonation 
NSAs	 frequently	 use	 landmines	 offen-
sively,	targeting	state	security	forces	or	other	
individuals	linked	to	the	state.	In	many	cas-
es,	NSAs	are	present	at	 the	 time	and	place	
of	the	landmine	attacks.	This	suggests	that	
for	these	NSAs,	command-detonated	 land-
mines	may	 be	 an	 alternative,	 and	 hence,	 a	
total	ban	on	AP	mines	may	be	possible.		
There	 is	 currently	 a	 trend	 in	 many	
conflicts	towards	increased	use	of	command-
detonated	 mines.	 However,	 although	
command-detonation	 is	 clearly	 preferable	
from	 a	 humanitarian	 point	 of	 view	 to	 vic-
tim	 and	 vehicle	 activation,	 this	 does	 not	
constitute	 a	 guarantee	 that	 civilians	 and	
humanitarian	actors	will	not	be	victimized,	
as	became	evident	 in	 the	 tragic	 incident	 in	
Nepal’s	Chitwan	district	in	June	200.6
Widespread Production and Use 
of IEDs 
Around	 0	 groups	 globally	 produced	
and	 used	 improvised	 explosive	 devices	 be-
tween	2003	and	200.2	This	indicates	that	a	
strategy	that	solely	targets	access	to	factory-
made	landmines	and	explosives	 is	not	suffi-
cient.	 Easy	 access	 to	materials	 necessary	 to	
manufacture	IEDs,	as	well	as	knowledge	and	
technology	 transfers	 among	NSAs,	 has	 un-
doubtedly	contributed	to	spreading	the	land-
mine	 problem.	 Nevertheless,	 IEDs	 do	 not	
always	constitute	indiscriminate	weapons	as	
this	depends	on	how	they	are	put	to	use.
Sources of Factory-made Mines 
Factory-made	landmines	are	accessible	to	
NSAs	through	at	least	three	sources:	
1.	 Minefields	or	stocks	
2.	 Certain	state	sponsors	
3.	 Other	NSAs	or	the	black	market
One	of	the	main	sources	of	factory-made	
landmines	for	NSAs	is	the	very	state	against	
which	 they	 are	 fighting.	 Incidents	 of	NSAs	
managing	to	loot	or	capture	landmines	from	
the	state	are	reported	regularly.	Such	has	re-
peatedly	been	the	case	in	the	Philippines	and	
Burma/Myanmar.	NSAs	 have	 also	 reported	
that	 soldiers	 from	 state	 armies	 have	 offered	
to	sell	them	landmines.	Furthermore,	foreign	
state	 sponsors	 are	 thought	 to	 supply	 NSAs	
with	factory-made	mines.
Large	areas	of	the	world	are	not	under	the	
effective	control	of	any	state,	a	fact	facilitating	
the	trafficking	of	arms	and	IED-making	ma-
terial	 among	NSAs.	Nevertheless,	 it	 should	
be	noted	that	in	some	post-conflict	situations	
there	 is	no	need	 for	NSAs	or	 individuals	 to	
look	for	sources	of	mines	since	weapons,	in-
cluding	mines,	are	plentiful	and	easily	avail-
able,	as	in	Afghanistan,	Iraq	and	Somalia.
Different	NSAs	have	allegedly	transferred	
to	 each	other	not	only	 arms	 and	 explosives	
but	 also	 the	 knowledge	 and	 technology	 on	
how	to	manufacture	landmines,	as	in	Burma/
Myanmar,	India	and	the	Philippines.	There	
are	also	allegations	that	some	transfers	are	of	
a	more	permanent	character	and	include	the	
joint	running	of	camps.	Indeed,	it	has	been	
asserted	 on	 more	 than	 one	 occasion	 that	
there	have	been	intense	contacts	between	the	
Nepalese	CPN-M	and	some	Indian	Maoists	
(CPI–M),	including	joint	training.7
Impact of NSA Mine Use
The	impact	of	NSA	mine	use	is	in	many	
respects	similar	to	the	impact	of	state	mine	
use.	 However,	 it	 appears	 that	 NSA	 mines	
are	more	widely	dispersed	than	state	mines	
and	non-state	actors	are	usually	less	prone	to	
mark	or	map	their	mines.	
The	humanitarian	impact	of	NSA	mine	
use	 is	 difficult	 to	 measure,	 since	 it	 takes	
place	in	a	conflict	situation,	in	areas	where	
little	or	no	mine	action	is	taking	place	and	
where	 civilians	 may	 fear	 reporting	 mine	
incidents.	 In	 addition,	 the	 humanitarian	
impact	 of	 NSA	 mine	 use	 is	 difficult	 to	
distinguish	from	that	of	the	conflict	itself	
until	 the	conflict	has	ended	and	 informa-
tion	 becomes	 available	 through	 mine-ac-
tion	efforts.	The	impact	of	former	mine	use	
by	NSAs	(anti-personnel	and	anti-vehicle)	
“There is currently a trend 
in many conflicts towards 
increased use of command-
detonated mines.”
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